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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KE:NNBCOTT COPPER CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

THE IXDGSTRIAL COMMISSION" OF UTAH and ROBERT
E. ~IARKUS,
Defendants.

10534

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF

STATEl\IENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an original proceedings before the Supreme
Court of Utah for the purpose of having the lawfulness
of an award dated December 14, 1965 of the Industrial
Commission of Utah in a proceedings entitled Robert
E . .Markus, Applicant, vs. Kennecott Copper Corporation, defendant, Claim No. 6315, inquired into and
determined as provided by Section 35-1-83, U.C.A.,
1953, as amended by Laws of Utah, 1965.
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DISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH
The Industrial Commission of Utah, on December
14, 1965, upon rehearing to consider the medical pane/1
report, ordered that Kennecott Copper Corporatiu11
pay Robert E. lVIarkus temporary total compensati 01 ,
from June 7, 1964 until Mr. Markus was released bi
his physician; that Kennecott Copper Corporation pa;
all medical and hospital expenses, but not in excess of
the Commission medical fee schedule; that Kennecott
Copper Corporation pay Mr. Markus permanent par·
tial disability for 10% loss of bodily function, or 20
weeks at $51.40 per week for a total of $1,~278.00;
and further ordered that Matt Baljanic be awarded
$150.00 attorney's fees.
The Commisson then denied a Motion for Review
filed by Kennecott Copper Corporation on January 13.
1966.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIE'V
Robert E. Markus seeks to have the award of the
Industrial Commission of December 14, 1965 sustained
by the Supreme Court of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Markus, on the 16th day of May, 1964, at or
about 10 :00 o'clock A.M., was underneath the wheels
of a derailed train car for the purpose of rerailing said
2

train car. This was part of his duties as a brakeman
and was done in the course of his employment ( R. 33) .
l\Iarkus testified that he received a sharp pain
between his shoulder blades while he was pushing a
frog up under the wheels of the train in order to rerail
said train car ( R. 32) . A frog is an instrument used
to rerail train cars and weighs between 50 and 100
pounds ( R. 33) . This process of rerailing requires the
operator to lie on his back while raising up and pushing
the frog and thus putting great strain on the upper
part of the body. Mr. :Marcus complained of the injury
to his engineer on the day he received the injury (R.
;35). Howeyer, it was not until the following Monday,
.May 18, 1964 that he could see a Kennecott Copper
doctor (R. 34) .
~Ir.

The doctor told him that it was just a muscle sprain
and for )1r ..Marcus to come back if it got worse. No
x-rays or other examinations were taken (R. 34-35).
The applicant continued to work, but continued to do
so with considerable pain.
On or about June l, 1964 .l\lr. Markus went on
vacation to California; while in California the pain
became so seYere he was required to go to a clinic for
treatment at Compton, California. Upon the advice
0f the clinic )1r. :Marcus saw a neurosurgeon in Downey,
California and, upon the complete examination by the
neurosurgeon, was advised that he should be hospitalized for further treatment (R. 36). whereupon Mr.
Markus decided to come back to Salt Lake City where
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he was examined by Dr. Wayne M. Hebertson IR.
36). Upon Dr. Hebertson's advice, Mr. Markus was
hospitalized and put in traction for approximately one
week. Tests were taken and upon the finding of three
discs out of place, Dr. Hebertson called in Dr. Boyrl
G. Holbrook and Dr. Thomas D. Noonan to perform
an operation upon Mr. Markus.
Mr. Markus filed a claim with the Industral Com·
mission of Utah on August 26, 1964 (R. 4). A hearing
was held on December 7, 1964 at which no medical
testimony was allowed (R. 11). On February 17.
1965 the Commission denied Mr. Markus' claim (R.
83). A Petition for Rehearing was filed with the Commission on March 8, 1965 ( R. 84-86) . The Commission,
by a general order, denied the Petition for Rehearing
on March 12, 1965.
On or about April 8, 1965, the attorney for the
applicant prepared a Writ of Certiorari to have the
Commission's Order of March 13, 1965 reviewed by the ·
Supreme Court. Prior to filing the Writ of Certiorari
on the above mentioned date, the attorney for the appli· ·
cant was informed by Commissioner Otto Wisley that
the Order dated March 12, 1965 would be vacated; that
as a matter of law the Commission did not have the
right to prevent the introduction of medical testimony
by the applicant. Ruth Griffith v. The Industrial Com·
mission, 16 U. 2d 264, 399 P.2d 204, 1965.
Attorney for the applicant, relying on the repre·
sentations of Commissioner Wiesley that the Industrial
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Commission would vacate its Order of March 12, 1965,
well within the statutory time for appeal, did not file
the 'Vrit of Certiorari with the court.
On the 13th day of April, 1965 the Industrial Commission vacated its Order of March 12, 1965 and granted
to the applicant a rehearing of the matter to allow intro·
duction of competent medical testimony on behalf of
the applicant.
On the 12th day of July, 1965, a rehearing wa~•
hel<l to allow the introduction of competent medical testimony. Subsequent to the rehearing, the medical tes·
timony and issues were submitted to a medical panel.
After examination of the applicant by the medical panel
appointed by the Commission, a report was filed ( R.
94) . The findings were as follows:
( 1) The type of maneuver as described by the
patient could be conceived to cause the herniation of the cervical intervertebral disc
giving rise to nerve root pain.
(2) The surgery performed was indicated and
successfully relieved the majority of the
individual's symptoms.

(3) Resulting limitation of motion in the neck
and the atrophy and weakness in the right
arm would give rise to a 10 percent permanent partial disability of the body as a
whole. (R. 95).
There were no objections filed as to this medical report
(R. 96).
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The Commission, on December 14, 1965, granted
an award to the applicant of permanent partial dis-,
ability for 10% loss of bodily function or 20 weeb
at $51.40 for a total of $1,028.00, and further ordered
that plaintiff pay applicant's attorney the sum ol '
$150.00 for legal services on behalf of the applicant.
Kennecott Copper Corporation then filed a Motion
for Review which was denied January 13, 1966.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ,
UTAH HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE
ORDER OF APRIL 13, 1965 GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR REHEARING.

It is the defendant's contention that the Industrial
Commission had jurisdiction to issue its Order of April ,
13, 1965 granting the Petition for Rehearing in that:

( l) The Industrial Commission never lost juris·
diction in the matter as a full hearing had never been
granted.
(2) By virue of Section 35-1-78 U.C.A. 1953 a~
amended, the Industrial Commission had continuin~
jurisdiction over the case and was acting within its
powers under that Section.
Defendant further claims that as Kennecott Cop·
per Corporation was present at the rehearing granted
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bv the Industrial Commission, it had submitted itself
t~ the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission and,

therefore, has no right to now argue the Commission's
lack of jurisdiction.
The Industrial Commission in its first hearing of
the case, allowed absolutely no medical evidence to be
introduced into the record. The defendant was prepared
to introduce medical testimony corroborating his testimony as to the injury resulting from an accident on
the job. The exclusion of the medical testimony was
prejudicial to the defendant in that the issue of an
mternal injury can only be answered by proper inquiry
by a medical panel competent to determine whether or
not such an injury could be caused by the facts as
alleged by the applicant. It is the contention of the
applicant that because of the denial of introduction of
medical testimony the applicant was denied a complete
hearing as contended by the Legislature under our
'Yorkman's Compensation statutes. The Supreme
Court has clearly followed this contention in a recent
case, Ruth Griffith v. The Industrial Commission, 16
l:.2d 264, 299 P.2d 204-206, 1965.
"'Vhere the injury complained of affects the
internal anatomy, by what means but through
medical testimony can petitioner prove that her
ailments were caused by the accident?"
It is this fact that establishes the proposition that the
lndusrial Commission ha<l not relinquished its jurisdiction oYer the matter. By granting a rehearing,
the Industrial Commission was correcting an error
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on its part. This correction was intended to save
an unnecessary appeal to the Supreme Court of
Utah. As Mr. Biljanic, attorney for applicant, stat.
ed at the rehearing, the basis for defendant's Petition for Rehearing was to put medical testimony into
the record, a right that had previously been denied
(R. 99), and it is significant to note that the Order
of the Commission denying recovery to the applicant
of February 17, 1965 states that the Commission denied
recovery on the basis that there was no competent
medical testimony of record (R. 83). This writer would
like to point out that it was by the Commission's own
act that competent medical testimony was refused by
the Commission and that as stated elsewhere in the
defendant's Brief, the Commission represented to ap·
plicant's attorney that it was vacating the Order of
March 12, 1965 at which a rehearing was denied to ,
the applicant on the basis of Griffith v. The Industrial
Commission, supra, and that this action would be ac·
complished within the statutory time for appeal.
The Industrial Commission, because it had not
given a complete hearing as demanded by law, corrected
the error and had the jurisdictional power to do so.
Defendant further contends that under Section
35-1-78, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, the Industrial Com·
mission, when it granted the Order for Rehearing.
would have jurisdiction of this case. Section 35-1-78
U.C.A. 1953 as amended, gives the Industrial Com·
mission continuing jurisdiction over each case with the
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power to mod~fy or cha~ge ~revious orders or findin~s
as in its opimon seem Justified. The purpose of this
Section is to take care of changed conditions or developments of any kind in order to do justice to the injured
party. This court has stated in Carter v. Industrial
Commission, 76 U. 520, 433, 290 P. 776:
"The continuing jurisdiction of industrial commission is not limited to consideration of changes
in physical condition of workmen, but is extended
to right to rescind, alter, or amend orders, decisions, or awards on good cause appearing therefor. In other words, the _commission under this
section has a wide discretion in the exercise of
its continuing jurisdiction conferred upon it, and
doctrine of res adjudicata and other commonlaw doctrines do not apply."
The Commission, failing to hear medical testimony
in this case, and by virtue of Section 35-1-78 U.C.A.
1953 as amended, had the jurisdiction to correct its
error and allow the rehearing.
In light of the court's recent decision in Griffith
v. Industrial Commission, supra, it would seem that the
plaintiff's arguments that the defendant failed to file
a 1Vrit of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah
within the 30 days after denial of the rehearing dated
March 12, 1965 and, therefore, exhausted his remedy,
is purely academic and has no merit. In the case Griffith
vs. Industrial Commission, supra, the court stated:
"\Vhen service of notice is made by mail, Rule

6 ( e), U.R.C.P. allows three days additional to

file .... 'Ve believe and hold that Rule 6 ( e),
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not inconsistent and not clearly inapplicable wit!
procedure of the Commission, supplements t[,
procedure of the Commission."
·
As the Industrial Commission's Order denying rehear·
ing was mailed to the defendant, and applying tlv
court's reasoning, the Commission's Order of April l:J.
1965 granting the Petition of Rehearing came out be.
fore the defendant's time had expired to petition th"
Supreme Court. The Order denying the Petition for.
Rehearing was dated .March 12, 1965; an extra three
days was given under Rule 6 ( e) U.R.C.P.; the de·
fendants had until April 14, 1965 to file its \Yrit .1!
Certiorari for the purpose of having the Commissim:,
Orders denying compensation and rehearing refused.
It is further contended that the plaintiff submitteJ
to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission at the
time of rehearing. If the plaintiff were going to raise
a question of jurisdiction, that would have been the
proper time, rather than after the hearing and the'
awarding contrary to plaintiff's desires.
The procedure the plaintiff has chosen here is one
of seeking to have a determination by the Commission
in its favor, then to have the Supreme Court review this·
determination on the basis or lack of jurisdiction in
the event said final award was in favor of defendant.
This clearly is not what the Legislature intended in
passing the act. The purpose of the Workman's Corn·
pensation Act is to protect workmen within the limit\
procured by the Act and thus the Act must be cou·
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strued liberally in order to make such legislative intent
effectual. Considering the intent of the Legislature,
the injured party should not be penalized or barred
from recovery because of technicalities and rigid interpretation of the laws.
POINT II
THERE \VERE FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND EVIDENCE
TO SL'PPORT THE A\VARD OF THE INDUSTRIAL CO~IMISSION.
The Plaintiff in its Brief recognizes that the Industrial Commission is vested with the exclusive power
and responsibility of deciding questions of fact. A
reading of the record of this matter would certainly
indicate that the Commission was justified in awarding
the recovery to the applicant and that the award is certainly based upon material, substantial and competent
legal evidence. The applicant, Mr. Robert E. Markus,
on cross examination by Mr. Evans, the attorney for
Kennecott Copper Corporation, testified as follows:
Q. And to put that frog in place you would push
it up by the wheel, wouldn't you?
A. No. It's practically impossible to push it on
the rocks. Because the rocks hang up on this
little gadget under the frog. So you have to
lift and push at the same time. Otherwise,
you can't get it over the rocks. It's hard to
slide through rocks or dirt.
11

Q. But in any event you were sliding this fr 0,1
and you weren't lifting the whole weight g,1
the frog to get it up in place, were you!
A. I was straining and lifting as much as I possibly could to get it up there, because then ·
is no such thing as just being able to push it
Because it's practically impossible to do j;
that way. (R. 40-41).
In the Plaintiff's Brief, plaintiff goes to gm!
length to make a distinction between lifting and push·
ing. This writer will not belabor the point; howeYer
the testimony is clear that the applicant was both lifting ,
and pushing as mentioned hereinabove.
The Commission, in its Order dated February Ii,
1965, states that the attorney for the applicant sug
gested lifting (R. 83). The above cited testimony indi·
cates that these facts were established by the attorney
for Kennecott Copper Corporation.
Again, on redirect examination, the applicant
1
reiterated that he was lifting the rerailing device known
as the frog (R. 49). 'Vitnesses, Mr. Asay and )Ir.
Strand, who testified at the first hearing that on the ·
day of the alleged accident the applicant appeared to
be alright in the morning, but after the train was re· .
railed, Mr. Strand said:
" ... he was going around like an old man that ,
was hurt." ( R. 57) .
Dr. Boyd Holbrook testified that the applicanb ,
history as related to him was that the applicant had
been under the wheels of a derailed train car and was
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lifting and developed a sudden pain between his shoulder
blades (R. 102). He further testified that a myelogram
erformed by Dr. Hebertson showed a large defect on
1e right side of the lower neck (R. 103). Plaintiff,
in its Brief, states that the hypothetical question proposed to Dr. Holbrook by applicant's attorney was not
based on facts that were in evidence; therefore, he contends that the opinion of Dr. Holbrook was improper.
Mr. Biljanic, attorney for the applicant at the rehearing, proposed the following hypothetical question to
Dr. Holbrook:

ri

" ... Assume if you will an injury on January
12, 1963, as elicited by Mr. Evans. Assume further that an individual over a year later is situated under a railroad car, and raising, lifting
and pushing a 75-Pound object over and away
from his body, under a railroad car. Can you give
an opinion as to the likelihood of one suffering
an injury such as the one as Mr. Marcus sustained?" ( R. 106).
The facts in the hypothetical question proposed by
applicant's attorney are based upon facts and evidence
which are clearly a part of the testimony and record.
Dr. Holbrook, in response to the above hypothetical
question, testified that it was likely that the applicant
sustained an injury at the time he was rerailing the
train car (R. 107-108).
The Industrial Commission appointed a medical
panel consisting of Norman R. Beck, M.D., Chairman;
Sherman S. Coleman, M.D.; and Samuel Taylor, M.D.,
1
'·hich met on August 27, 1965. l\1r. Markus was ex-
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amined by the panel at the time of said meeting. c,
1
conclusion of the medical examination the panel m:1,
the following finding:
( 1) The type of maneuver as described br 1:
patient could be conceived to cause th~ nc
niation of the cervical intervertebral 1j,.
giving rise to nt;_rve root pain.
( 2) The surgery p~_rformed was indicated :u:
successfully relieved the majority of 11
individual's symptoms.
( 3) Resulting limitation of motion in the ne1
and the atrophy and weakness in the rig1
arm would give rise to 10 percent perruc
nent partial disability of the body a.,
whole.

The Commission, after review of all the materiJ
substantial and competent evidence and testimony in\rr·
duced at the time of the hearings on this matter, ot
December 14, 1965 made a finding that there had beet
an accident and that the applicant was entitled to rec01
ery (R. 115). The Commission's award was certainl1
based upon competent evidence and testimony as meE
tioned above. The medical panel found the extent
the injury and the type of injury claimed by the appli·
cant could have been caused by the activities ana
maneuvers that Mr. Markus alleged caused his injuD
11

CONCLUSION
This writer in several instances has pointed oui.
competent evidence and testimony introduced at the
time of the hearings in this matter contained in !lit
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record and transcripts. It should be noted that the Industrial Commission is sole Judge of the credibility of
witnesses, weight of evidence and facts, and their deci~ion thereon is final if there is any substantial evidence
to sustain it. Chief Consol. Min. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 70 U. 333, 260 P. 271. Defendant respectfully
submits that the award of the Industrial Commission
of Utah dated December 14, 1965, be sustained in favor
of defendant Markus in that it was justified by the
record of the proceedings and evidence before the Commission properly weighed the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Utah Attorney General
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Defendant The
Industrial Commission of Utah
MATT BILJANIC
8138 South State Street
Midvale, Utah
and
EVERETT E. DAHL
760 East Center Street
Midvale, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant
Robert E. Markus
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